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Delegated Interstate War: Introducing an Addition to Armed 
Conflict Typologies 
Abstract 
Drawing the dividing line between civil and interstate war can be a difficult task. This task 
is made even more difficult by a gap in the current typology of armed conflict. The conflict 
studies literature in general and the coding rules of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in 
particular acknowledge that internal conflict can involve external actors but ignore that 
interstate conflict can be disguised as internal rebellion. This creates an unnecessary risk 
of categorization errors and a risk of neglecting the potential complexity of interstate 
conflict in the modern world. This article uses Idean Salehyan's distinction between 
intervention and delegation, the Nicaragua Judgement of the International Court of Justice, 
and the debate on the causes of the war in eastern Ukraine to illustrate this point. On the 
basis of this discussion, it proposes the introduction of a new category – delegated 
interstate conflict – to create a more coherent and symmetrical typology. 
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Introduction 
 
Civil war overshadows interstate war in the modern world in terms of 
both frequency and destructiveness. According to the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP)–currently the world’s most comprehensive and 
elaborate academic database of post-World War II organized violence–
interstate conflicts have constituted only a tiny fraction of all state-
based armed conflicts recorded since 1946.1 On average, the UCDP 
recorded fewer than two interstate conflicts per year, compared to 
about 29 internal conflicts. Moreover, since 1989, interstate conflict 
has resulted in an estimate of just over 130,000 combat-related deaths 
compared to around 1,200,000 combat-related fatalities in internal 
conflicts.2  
 
The conflict studies literature has only relatively recently reacted to the 
dominance of internal conflict that the UDCP data illustrates. Lars-Erik 
Cederman and Manuel Vogt argue in their review of the academic 
literature on civil war “most scholarship using ‘civil war’ as a 
conceptual category appeared during the past one and a half decades.”3 
This is in line with Stathis Kalyvas’ assessment, who, about ten years 
earlier, argued “civil war has attracted considerable scholarly attention 
from various disciplines–though considerably less than interstate 
war.”4 Nevertheless, Kalyvas already observed “a recent boom in civil 
war studies,” which was “fueled by the global shift from interstate to 
intrastate conflict.”5  
 
A shift of research focus toward civil war is an important adjustment to 
the empirical reality. However, this does not mean that academics 
should treat interstate conflict as a relic of the past–as something 
inherently more straightforward and archaic than internal conflict. 
This article argues the current conflict studies literature, and especially 
the UCDP’s typology of armed conflict, is in danger of overshooting the 
mark. The conflict studies literature and the UCDP underestimate the 
complexity of interstate conflict and the potential blurriness of the 
dividing line between the two types.  
 
The argument proceeds in five steps. Firstly, the conflict studies 
literature has paid insufficient attention to the distinction between 
third-party intervention and third-party delegation in armed conflicts. 
Secondly, this lack of attention manifests itself in the UCDP’s three-way 
typology of armed conflict. Thirdly, the introduction of a new category–
delegated interstate conflict–can mitigate the risk of neglecting the 
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potential complexity of interstate war in the modern world. Fourthly, 
the academic debate on the categorization of the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine’s Donbas region illustrates the usefulness of this new category. 
Finally, the introduction of delegated interstate conflict should go hand 
in hand with a new research agenda focusing on forensic case-study 
research of armed conflict. 
 
Intervention versus Delegation  
 
This article builds on Idean Salehyan’s criticism of the conflict studies 
literature’s disregard for indirect interstate conflict strategies. 
According to Salehyan, foreign governments often support rebel 
organizations “as a substitute for the direct use of force” when states 
want to avoid engaging their own armies in “costly military 
campaigns.”6 Excluding such cases of conflict delegation from studies 
of interstate violence “can lead empirical analyses to significantly 
inflate the amount of peace in the international system.”7 
 
Salehyan distinguishes delegation from intervention. Intervention, he 
argues, “suggests that the civil war has domestic roots; foreign 
governments are tangential to the onset of the war and become 
involved once fighting is underway.”8 The foreign state has “little direct 
control or influence over war aims and strategies.”9 Rebel forces 
“preserve their organizational autonomy.”10 Delegation, on the other 
hand, “indicates that external actors play an important role in shaping 
the insurgency” and “are critical to the organization’s viability and 
structure.”11 At the same time, “delegation requires some degree of 
agenda control over agents–patrons influence the aims, strategies, and 
tactics of the rebel group.”12 
 
This distinction is missing from the literature on proxy or surrogate 
warfare–terms, which are widely used to describe a variety of third-
party involvement in armed conflicts. Alex Marshall, for example, 
argues that both interstate wars, such as Cuba’s 1975 operation in 
Angola, and civil wars, such as the ongoing war in Syria, qualify as 
proxy or surrogate wars if conflict parties receive foreign support.13 
Vladimir Rauta uses the term proxy war to describe what Salehyan 
defines as intervention, while Anthony Vinci speaks of proxies to 
describe what Salehyan defines as delegation.14 In addition, Amos Fox’s 
proposed theory of proxy/surrogate warfare encompasses both 
intervention and delegation.15   
 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss4/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.4.1756
 
92 
 
International law, however, draws a dividing line between internal and 
interstate conflict that is similar to Salehyan’s distinction between 
intervention and delegation. It distinguishes between support for rebel 
forces on the one hand and effective control over them on the other. A 
1986 landmark decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)–the 
judgement in the case Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua–assesses this topic in detail. The Court argued that 
the scale of support that the United States provided to Nicaraguan 
rebel forces was not sufficient to conclude that all of the rebels’ actions 
were actions of the United States under international law.16 At the same 
time, the Court outlined the criteria, which this particular case failed to 
meet. The Court said that it had had to determine whether the 
relationship between the United States and the rebels “was so much 
one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it 
would be right to equate the contras [rebels], for legal purposes, with 
an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of 
that Government.”17  
 
This article proposes merging Salehyan’s concepts of intervention and 
delegation with this legal principle of effective control to create 
definitions that are more precise. According to these definitions, 
delegation occurs if a foreign state controls a rebel force to a degree 
comparable to a state organ. Foreign support that falls below this 
threshold is intervention. 
 
Drawing the dividing line between civil and interstate war according to 
these criteria remains a challenging task. Salehyan acknowledges that 
distinguishing between intervention and delegation can be difficult in 
practice, because the foreign state may lose control over rebels that it 
used for delegation, or increase control over rebels after engaging in 
intervention.18 Moreover, the ICJ notes that the facts of the Nicaragua 
case were difficult to establish because of the secretive nature of the 
operations in question–a problem that probably applies to most cases 
of foreign powers interacting with rebels.19  
 
These difficulties are, perhaps, the reason why subsequent studies on 
foreign sponsorship of rebel forces have not acted on Salehyan’s 
suggestion to distinguish between intervention and delegation. Neither 
do they pay attention to the differentiation between support and 
effective control in international law. Instead, they keep these concepts 
merged within a single variable, which they use for their research on 
civil war. Salehyan, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham 
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investigate which factors determine whether rebel groups receive 
foreign support.20 Matthew Moore shows that the transfer of arms to 
rebels from external sources prolongs civil wars and increases their 
deadliness.21 Salehyan, David Siroky, and Reed Wood argue that 
foreign sponsorship of rebel forces increases the likelihood of crimes 
against civilians.22 Bryce Reeder finds that foreign interference in civil 
wars is an important factor that increases the risk or the severity of 
subsequent interstate conflict.23 Henning Tamm investigates under 
what conditions foreign sponsorship increases or decreases internal 
cohesion of rebel groups.24 Milos Popovic finds that rebel forces 
without a centralized organizational structure are more difficult to 
control than centralized ones.25 He also finds that foreign sponsorship 
increases the chances of alliance formation between different rebel 
groups.26 Ryan Grauer and Dominic Tierney argue that the overall 
likelihood of rebel forces receiving foreign support has increased over 
time.27 In addition, Thomas Waldman analyzes the “strategic 
narratives” which the United States uses to justify its support of rebel 
forces.28 All of these works address important issues. None of them, 
however, questions if what it is researching still qualifies as civil war. 
On the contrary, all of them imply that all forms of foreign involvement 
blur the boundary between civil and interstate war in the same way–by 
introducing an interstate element into a civil war. 
 
The UCDP’s Three-Way Typology 
 
The UCDP follows the same logic by dividing civil war into two separate 
categories: Internal armed conflict and internationalized internal 
armed conflict. Conflicts of the latter category feature intervention 
from other states. In conflicts of the former category, no such 
intervention takes place.29 In light of the above definitions of 
intervention and delegation, this subdivision of the civil war category 
raises two questions. Firstly, the UCDP defines intervention from other 
states in terms of “active troop participation.”30 What this means is that 
the UCDP would categorize an internal conflict featuring a brief, 
insignificant presence of foreign troops as internationalized. At the 
same time, it would categorize a conflict, in which one side relies on 
foreign funding, training, or arms instead of troops as purely internal. 
Secondly, and more importantly, there is no analogous subdivision of 
interstate conflict. There is no mention of the possibility that interstate 
conflict may assume forms different from the open clash of two states’ 
regular armed forces. Just like the wider conflict studies literature, the 
UCDP does not differentiate between intervention and delegation but 
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places both forms of foreign involvement in the internationalized 
internal conflict category.  
 
On first sight, this category may appear as the middle ground between 
an interstate conflict and a purely internal conflict. However, this is a 
flawed perception. An internationalized internal conflict is always 
closer to a purely internal conflict than to an interstate conflict. The 
UCDP’s definition of the internationalized internal conflict category 
specifies a clear hierarchy between the internal and the international 
dimension. The rebels are always the primary conflict party and the 
foreign state is always the secondary party providing support.31 
Essentially, this is a definition of intervention rather than delegation. 
Consequently, the dichotomous civil-interstate war typology, which still 
dominates academic research and the wider political and legal 
discourse, will define all internationalized internal conflicts as civil 
wars rather than as something in between civil and interstate war. 
 
The UCDP’s typology reflects the fact that foreign involvement in civil 
wars is a widely acknowledged phenomenon in both academia and 
politics. However, it also reflects a lack of awareness of how important 
the difference between intervention and delegation actually is. An 
attack by undercover Special Forces or mercenaries of a foreign state is 
not the same as a local insurrection that receives foreign support. The 
former scenario is more similar to an interstate war than to the latter 
scenario. Vice versa, the latter scenario is more similar to a civil war 
than to the former scenario. Each scenario requires different policy 
responses and different approaches to conflict resolution.  
 
What is more, even if a researcher is aware of the possibility that 
interstate violence may occur in a covert, delegated way, the current 
typology simply does not offer a way to reflect this. The current three-
way typology categorizes cases that do not resemble the classical 
interstate war scenario of one country openly attacking another with 
regular armed forces almost always as internationalized internal 
conflicts. This means that the current typology essentially categorizes 
such conflicts as civil wars, which they are not. Therefore, ignoring the 
difference between intervention and delegation increases the risk of 
categorization errors, which may lead to flawed academic comparisons 
and flawed policies. 
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Introducing Delegated Interstate Conflict   
 
A better alternative would be the creation of delegated interstate 
conflict as a new subcategory of interstate conflict. This category would 
include conflicts in which one state engages in armed combat on the 
territory of another state via irregular militias, which the foreign state 
controls to such an extent that they effectively act as a state organ. 
Using this category would create a more symmetrical typology, 
consisting of interstate, delegated interstate, internationalized internal, 
and internal armed conflict. This typology would allow comparison 
according to the civil war-interstate war dichotomy as well as the 
exclusion and separate study of the mixed categories in between. At the 
same time, it would increase transparency and reduce the risk of 
classification errors. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed typology through 
a simple 2x2 matrix. It is similar to a typology matrix by Simeon 
Nichter, which David Collier, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright use as 
an example in their “template for the rigorous construction of 
typologies.”32 
 
Figure 1: Categories of State-Based Armed Conflict 
Is a foreign state participating indirectly–either as a secondary conflict party supporting a 
primary conflict party or as a primary conflict party controlling a secondary conflict party?   
  
Pure conflict: foreign support or 
control absent 
Mixed conflict: foreign 
support or control present 
Is one of the 
primary 
conflict parties 
a rebel group? 
Civil war: 
rebel group 
present 
Internal Internationalized internal 
Interstate 
war: rebel 
group absent 
Interstate Delegated interstate 
Source: Author 
 
Estimating the frequency of delegated interstate conflict would require 
a thorough review of cases that the UCDP currently classifies as 
internal and internal internationalized. It is unlikely that such a review 
would find that the prevalence of non-interstate conflict since the end 
of World War II is due to a large number of wrongly categorized 
delegated interstate conflicts. However, even a change in the 
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categorization of a small number of cases could have an impact on the 
findings of comparative research on interstate war, because this type of 
war has become such a rare occurrence. In any case and regardless of 
its frequency, delegated interstate war is more than just a theoretical 
possibility. An important illustration of this is the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine’s Donbas region. 
 
The Case of the Donbas Conflict 
 
The Ukrainian authorities have portrayed the conflict in the Donbas as 
a Russian act of aggression from its beginning. On 13 April 2014, 
Ukraine’s then Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov announced that 
his administration had initiated a military operation in the east of the 
country. He said this decision had been made after “terrorist units 
coordinated by the Russian Federation” occupied police stations in the 
towns of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.33 Ever since, Kyiv’s line has 
remained the same: Ukraine is defending itself against Russia, which 
attacked Ukraine’s southeast using special service units supported by 
local mercenaries, before intervening with its regular armed forces. 
Current Ukrainian legislation accuses Russia of armed aggression and 
labels eastern Ukraine’s self-proclaimed separatist republics a “Russian 
occupation administration.”34 The Russian authorities, on the other 
hand, have consistently denied any involvement in the conflict beyond 
humanitarian aid for suffering civilians and the presence of some 
volunteers with Russian citizenship among the separatist forces. 
According to Moscow, the conflict is an internal Ukrainian problem. 
Russia is an arbiter in the peace process but by no means a conflict 
party.35 
 
The nascent academic debate on the nature and causes of the Donbas 
conflict is not as polarized as the positions of Kyiv and Moscow. Most 
scholars accept that an interplay between domestic and foreign factors 
characterizes the conflict. However, when it comes to the relative 
importance of these factors, the academic debate shows a divide that is 
similar to the divide in the political discourse. One group of scholars 
argues for the primacy of interstate factors, while another group argues 
that internal factors are dominant. Nikolay Mitrokhin locates the 
primary causes of the conflict in Moscow. He portrays the escalation of 
violence as a targeted military operation and argues that Russia 
gradually intensified its military engagement in Ukraine as its 
destabilization efforts met increasing resistance from Kyiv.36 Andrew 
Wilson also concludes “the war that began in 2014 was not a civil war 
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with foreign intervention but a process catalyzed and escalated by local 
elites and by Russia, with local foot-soldiers.”37 In addition, Mark 
Galeotti emphasizes the role of Russia’s military intelligence service–
the GRU–in the Donbas.38 Serhiy Kudelia, on the other hand, argues, 
“although many blame Moscow for starting the war in the region, the 
key role was played by processes that took place within Ukraine.”39 
Ivan Katchanovski claims “the predominant involvement of local 
separatists at the start of the conflict […] points to the origins of this 
conflict as a civil war.”40 Moreover, Richard Sakwa claims Moscow’s 
“initial material support” for separatism in the Donbas “was greatly 
exaggerated by the Kyiv government and its Western supporters.”41 The 
UCDP’s current coding seems to be closer to this second group of 
scholars. It categorizes the conflict in the Donbas as a group of three 
internal conflicts between the Ukrainian Government and local 
separatist forces. The UCDP acknowledges Russian support for these 
forces by defining all of these internal conflicts as internationalized, 
listing Russia as the secondary conflict party.42 
 
Other scholars are likely to use this categorization not only for their 
research but also for policy recommendations. Jesse Driscoll, for 
example, argues in a recent policy memo that the UCDP “codes the 
Ukraine conflict as a civil war.”43 He then suggests that policy makers 
should accept this categorization to increase the chances of conflict 
resolution in the Donbas. According to Driscoll, acknowledging that the 
conflict is a civil war would allow the pursuit of an “elections first, 
military drawdown later” approach as a more pragmatic strategy 
towards peace.44 As Tymofii Brik points out, interpreting the conflict in 
this way is problematic. According to Brik, Driscoll’s proposal takes 
advantage of the UCDP typology’s ambiguity to justify disregard for the 
interstate dimension of the Donbas conflict. Brik argues that the 
UCDP’s definition of internationalized internal conflict “does not 
include the word ‘civil war,’ yet one still could argue that this definition 
describes civil wars in some generic way.”45 He claims that this is a 
matter of personal interpretation, which Driscoll uses to justify a policy 
proposal that carries the risk of letting Moscow “get away with 
international crimes” and poses “a serious threat to peace-building in 
Ukraine.”46 Brik’s assessment suggests that the current UCDP typology 
lacks clarity regarding the different ways in which internal and 
interstate factors can interact in a conflict like the one in Ukraine. 
Adding delegated interstate war as a category would address this 
shortcoming and could provide a basis for reassessing the conflict’s 
categorization.  
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss4/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.4.1756
 
98 
 
 
Mitrokhin, Wilson, and Galeotti, who locate the conflict’s primary 
causes in Moscow, go even further. Although they do not explicitly 
consider the correct coding of the conflict in datasets, their 
interpretation clearly suggests that the current categorization is 
incorrect and that the UCDP should code the events as a single 
interstate conflict. In turn, this would imply that conflict resolution has 
to start in Moscow rather than in Kyiv. Interpreting events in the 
Donbas in this way remains controversial. Just as controversial, 
however, are the practical implications of the UCDP’s current 
categorization of the conflict. According to the UCDP, the war in the 
Donbas falls into the same category as, for example, the war in Syria 
and Russia’s role in both conflicts is the same.  
 
Challenges and Prospects 
 
These academic controversies concerning the correct categorization of 
the Donbas conflict support the observation by Salehyan and the ICJ 
that differentiating between intervention and delegation can be a 
challenging task. A state engaging in conflict delegation will usually 
make efforts to maintain plausible deniability by covering its tracks, 
which, in turn, makes it more difficult to establish the exact degree of 
its involvement. For this reason, the introduction of delegated 
interstate war should ideally go hand in hand with a new research 
agenda, which takes a forensic, case study-based approach to studying 
the origins of armed conflict. A promising methodological framework 
for this purpose, which has so far received relatively little attention in 
relation to the study of armed conflict, is process tracing.47 In cases of 
older conflicts, process-tracing analysis could take advantage of 
recently declassified documents or new eyewitness testimony. In cases 
of recent or ongoing conflicts, it could make use of modern information 
technology. The Internet and, in particular, the rise of social media has 
given researchers access to conflict zones at an unprecedented scale. It 
provides a large volume photo and video material as well as eyewitness 
accounts that can be gathered, crosschecked, and analyzed. An 
illustration of how this can work in practice is a recent investigation by 
the Forensic Architecture research agency into Russia’s role in the 2014 
Battle of Ilovaisk–a key turning point of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. 
Forensic Architecture gathered, verified, and catalogued the openly 
available evidence for Russian involvement in the battle and presented 
it on an interactive online platform.48 Even though Russia tried to cover 
its traces, footage of captured servicemen and destroyed tanks, Google 
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Earth satellite imagery of military convoys, and eyewitness reports of 
participants painted a concise picture of its role in the battle. Forensic 
Architecture’s Ilovaisk project is only one example of how journalists 
and activists have successfully used open source intelligence (OSINT) 
analysis in the context of the Ukraine conflict. Academic research could 
build on this work and use OSINT analysis as a basis for process tracing 
to establish whether the Donbas conflict is a case of delegation or 
intervention. Researchers could do the same for other conflicts that are 
taking place in the age of modern information technology. 
 
Naturally, certain limitations remain. Despite the potential of 
declassified documents and OSINT analysis, gaps in the data are 
inevitable in cases of covert military aggression. Moreover, there is the 
problem of personal bias, which means that different researchers may 
interpret the same data in different ways. However, researchers can 
mitigate both of these problems to some extent. A recent study by 
Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos and Jody LaPorte looks at steps that 
process-tracing research can take to address the problem of missing 
data.49 Bayesian logic, on the other hand, can reduce the problem of 
bias by forcing researchers to make the probabilistic reasoning behind 
their evaluation of evidence explicit.50 
 
Finally, none of the challenges, opportunities, and limitations 
discussed above is unique to the study of conflict delegation and 
intervention. They are important topics of academic debate and 
research both in the field of conflict studies and in the social sciences in 
general. The introduction of delegated interstate war as a new conflict 
category will draw attention to them and encourage researchers to 
engage with them more broadly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that current armed conflict typologies run the 
risk of underestimating the complexity of interstate conflict and its role 
in the modern world. It has discussed the difference between third-
party intervention and third-party delegation in armed conflicts, using 
the work of Idean Salehyan and the Nicaragua Judgement of the ICJ. It 
has then shown that current academic research fails to pay sufficient 
attention to this differentiation. The UCDP’s armed conflict typology 
both reflects and exacerbates this lack of attention. Based on this 
discussion, this article has proposed the introduction of delegated 
interstate conflict as a new subcategory of interstate conflict. This 
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subcategory should include conflicts where one state engages in combat 
on the territory of another state via irregular militias, which the foreign 
state controls to such an extent that they effectively act as one of its 
state organs. 
 
This article has illustrated the usefulness of delegated interstate conflict 
as a category by reviewing the academic controversy regarding the 
categorization of the conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Some 
scholars portray this conflict as a civil war with some degree of Russian 
intervention, while others portray it as an invasion in disguise. 
Currently, both of these hypotheses remain controversial and further 
research on Russia’s role in the early stages of the Donbas conflict is 
required. However, such research has to take into account that the 
claim that the Donbas conflict is interstate does not rest on the 
assumption that it is an open invasion of one country by another 
country’s regular armed forces. It rests on the assumption that the case 
of the Donbas in 2014 meets the criteria that the ICJ formulated in 
1986. This would mean that eastern Ukraine’s separatist militias are 
not an autonomous rebel force but, in fact, an organ of the Russian 
state, waging a delegated war on the Kremlin’s behalf.  
 
Because of the covert nature of both conflict delegation and 
intervention, the difference between the two phenomena is difficult to 
establish. However, this article has argued that researchers can address 
this challenge through forensic case study research based on process-
tracing methodology. Combined with such an approach, a four-way 
typology of armed conflict–consisting of interstate, delegated 
interstate, internationalized internal, and internal–would improve 
research on the causes of the Donbas conflict as well as policy 
proposals resulting from this research. Research on various other past, 
present, or future conflicts is likely to benefit in similar ways. 
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